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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO, 1 
Whether the Trial Judge abused his discretion or made an erroneous finding 
of fact in crediting Defendant/Appellee with having paid eighty percent (80%) of his child 
support obligation during the years of 1986 and 1987, based upon his testimony, contrary to 
that of Plaintiff/Appellant, without any documentation, any testimony of efforts made to 
obtain said documentation and when Defendant/Appellee testified that he had not filed 
income taxes for several years. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in domestic cases regarding the Court's equitable 
powers in making orders in a divorce action should only be overturned if there is a "manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 
P.2d 818, 819-820 (Utah App. 1992). In determining whether the trial court made an 
incorrect finding of fact should be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, in which 
it must "decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported 
by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
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court's determination." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. $ 30-3-5 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. . . . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) 
General rules of pleadings. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, 
statute of frauds, statute of limitation, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance 
or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim 
or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the 
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 
Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
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jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41 (b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision 
on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry 
of judgment the Court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
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judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusion of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of 
fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1, NATURE OF THE CASE 
A California judgment was filed dissolving the parties' marriage on July 29, 
1987. Pursuant to said judgment, Defendant/Appellee was ordered to pay child support of 
$440.00 per child beginning October 15,1986 and pay the Plaintiff/Appellant an additional 
$10,000.00 for a property settlement, no later than October 1, 1985. Said California 
judgment was filed in the Fifth District Court of Washington County, State of Utah on March 
6,1996 under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (U.C. A. 78-22a-1, et.seq.). Plaintiff/Appellant 
filed a Motion For Order To Show Cause on or about October 25,1996 . The Court held an 
evidentiary hearing on January 9, 1997, in which the Court took testimony from the parties 
on the issue. The Court then received several additional Affidavits from the parties along 
with additional documentation of payments and issued a Memorandum Decision dated 
October 27, 1997. In its Memorandum Decision, the Court failed to address the alleged 
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unpaid support for 1986 and 1987, and the $10,000 property issue. Plaintiff/Appellant 
objected to the Memorandum Decision, and following further hearings, the Court issued a 
subsequent Ruling dated April 27, 1998. In its Ruling, the Court found that, while the 
Defendant/Appellee had no documentation for paid support during 1986 and 1987, that based 
upon his other payments, he should be credited with payment of 80% of the obligation during 
that time. A final Judgment was signed on October 12, 1998 and entered on October 14, 
1998. Plaintiff/Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on November 13, 1998. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Foreign Judgment in this matter was filed on March 6,1996. A Motion For Order 
To Show Cause was filed on October 25, 1996. When Defendant/Appellee objected, 
claiming he had made payments for the unpaid support, the Court held an evidentiary hearing 
on January 9,1997. The Court allowed subsequent submissions and documentary evidence 
through Affidavit and issued a Memorandum Decision on October 17, 1997. In its 
Memorandum Decision, the Court found that the Defendant/Appellee owed 
Plaintiff/Appellant monies for unpaid child support. Plaintiff/Appellant objected to the 
Memorandum Decision on February 3,1998, claiming that it did not provide for any of the 
support requested for 1986 and 1987 and also the $10,000.00 which was to be paid as a 
property settlement. On April 27, 1998, the Court issued a Ruling, awarding the 
Plaintiff/Appellant some monies and crediting Defendant/Appellee with some additional 
payments. A final Judgment was signed on October 12, 1998 and entered on October 14, 
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1998. PlaintiftfAppellant filed her Notice of Appeal on November 13, 1998. 
3, DISPOSITION IN THE COURT ROOM 
The Trial Court found that the Defendant/Appellee had paid 80% of the child support 
he was ordered to pay from October 15,1986 until December 31,1987. The Court did award 
Plaintiff/Appellant some monies for unpaid child support for subsequent years, granting 
Defendant/Appellee a credit for the time that Plaintiff Appellant resided with him for a 
period of time in 1991 and 1992. The Court further ruled that Plaintiff/Appellant had not 
received the $10,000.00 payment required by the California judgment and awarded 
Plaintiff/Appellant interest and attorney's fees. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced in a Decree of Divorce in the state of California filed 
July 29, 1987. (R.002) The Decree ordered the Defendant/Appellee to pay the 
Plaintiff/Appellant child support at the rate of $440.00 per month per child beginning in 
October 15, 1996 and also ordered him to pay the Plaintiff Appellant $10,000.00 as a 
property settlement. (R.003, 004) The Plaintiff7Appellant filed the Decree in Utah as a 
foreign judgment on March 6, 1996 (R. ). The Defendant/Appellee later claimed to have 
paid some monies towards the support and also claimed to have paid the $10,000.00. 
In evidentiary hearings, and in subsequent Affidavits with supporting 
documentary evidence, the Court eventually ruled in Plaintiff/Appellant's favor on the 
majority of the issues, with one major exception. The Court, in its April 27, 1998 Ruling 
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held that the Defendant/Appellee should be credited with 80% of the amounts he was to pay 
the Plaintiff/Appellant, awarding her a judgment of only 20% of the amount. (R.357). This 
was despite the Plaintiff/Appellant's clear testimony that she had never received any support 
(Transcript P. 168) (R.173). In addition, there was no testimony that regarding the efforts 
the Defendant/Appellee had taken in order to locate the documentation and his clear 
testimony that he had not filed income tax returns for several years. (Transcript pp. 139-142) 
The Court's finding were included in a final Judgment dated October 12,1998 
prepared by counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant (R.403). The Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice 
of Appeal on November 14, 1998. (R.411) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant's arguments can be easily summed up as follows: the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in crediting the Defendant/Appellee with payments for child 
support without supporting documentary evidence where the Defendant/Appellee failed to 
meet his burden for his affirmative defense of payment by testifying of any efforts on his part 
to locate or replace lost documentation and where his credibility should not have been relied 
on due to his failure to file income tax returns for several years. The Trial Court further 
erred in its interpretation of the Ciraulo case, Ciraulo v. Ciraulo. 576 p.2d 884 (Utah 
1978),by apparently relying on its award of broad discretion in finding whether or not the 
Defendant/Appellant had made his payments. The Court further erred in its finding that there 
was sufficient evidence to show that Defendant/Appellant had paid 80% of his child support 
7 
obligation in 1986 and 1987. 
Based upon the Trial Court's erroneous ruling that Defendant/Appellee had 
paid 80 % of his child support obligation for 1986 and 1987, the Court should reverse the 
Court's Ruling on that issue and amend the Final Judgment in the case to show that 
Defendant/Appellee paid no child support in 1986 and 1987 and award the 
Plaintiff/Appellant additional interest, attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
I. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
1, Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Holding That Defendant/Appellee Had Paid 
80% Of His Child Support For 1986 And 1987, 
In arguing abuse of discretion in domestic matters, "The burden is upon 
Appellant to prove that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings as made; or 
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Mitchell v. Mitchell 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974). 
Here, the Plaintiff/Appellant testified clearly and unequivocally that she had 
not received any child support from 1986 and 1987. (Transcript 168, R. 173). The 
Defendant/Appellee did not testify about efforts made by him to locate any records, claiming 
to have "lost them in a move". Even more damaging to Defendant/Appellee's credibility 
was his testimony that he had not filed any income tax returns for "several years." 
(Transcript 139-142). 
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While it is admittedly the case that Defendant/Appellee had made some child 
support payments over the years, with the exception of the time Plaintiff/Appellant spent 
residing with him, the trial court found that he did have an arrearage for every year he was 
to pay such support. (R.352) There is absolutely nothing in the record to substantiate his 
payment of 80% of the amounts for 1986 and 1987. This constitutes a prejudicial abuse of 
discretion against the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
II, The Court Erred In Its Interpretation Of The Ciraulo Case In Holding That It 
Had Broad Discretion In Determining Whether The Defendant/Appellee Had Paid A 
Portion Of Child Support In 1986 and 1987, 
In its April 27,1998 Ruling, the Court cited Ciraulo v. Ciraulo, 576 P.2d 884, 
for the premise that is had "discretion" in setting the amount of child support arrearage. 
(R.357). In Ciraulo, the trial court had found that a father who had insufficient documentary 
evidence had not paid his child support and the appellate court upheld the decision. The 
Ruling cited only a portion of the language in Ciraulo and a full citation would be appropriate 
here. "[W]e see nothing to persuade us that the findings and judgment of the trial court, 
which included the award of the home to the plaintiff so she would have the benefit and use 
thereof in providing for the children, was anything other than fair, reasonable and equitable, 
and well within the comparatively wide latitude of discretion that we have always recognized 
the trial court should have in such matters. Ciraulo at 886 [emphasis added]. 
In Ciraulo, which was a supplemental proceeding to collect unpaid child 
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support (similar to this instance), the Supreme Court quoted the trial court's findings which 
awarded any equity in the parties' home to the claimant "in lieu of any such claims" [child 
support] Ciraulo at 886 [emphasis added in the original quotation]. This case is distinguished, 
because the Utah trial court is not exercising the "broad discretion" generally allowed in 
divorce matters for the equity of the parties, but is merely enforcing the decree of another 
Court. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow Defendant/Appellee to have 
credit for child support as a discretionary, equitable function, as given in Ciraulo. 
Ill, The Defendant/Appellee Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proof On His 
Affirmative Defense That He Had Paid Child Support In 1986 And 1987 And The 
Court Erred In Finding That He Had, 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) lists payment as an affirmative defense. 
Such affirmative defenses as payment must be "proved by the party asserting it." Rees v. 
Archibald. 311 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1957). 
Here the Defendant/Appellee had the affirmative burden to prove that he had 
paid some of his child support in 1986 and 1987. His testimony failed to indicate any efforts 
he had made to obtain documentation of his payments and he further admitted to not having 
filed tax returns for the last several years. (Transcript 139-142). This lack of testimony and 
admitted wrong-doing is directly counter to the testimony of the Plaintiff/Appellant that she 
had not received any child support during those years. 
This fails to meet the standard set forth in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
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1994) which requires that clear error be found when, after all evidentiary conflicts in the 
record are weighed in favor of the finder of fact, the record does not adequately support the 
finding. Here, there is not such adequate support. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court in this case clearly erred by abusing its discretion, by misapplying its 
equitable powers in divorce actions and failing to properly weigh the evidence (or lack 
thereof) in determining that Defendant/Appellee had paid 80% of his child support for 1986 
and 1987. For these reasons, the Court should overturn the trial court's Judgment for the 
years of 1986 and 1987 and hold that there are no payments for those years, awarding 
Plaintiff/Appellant interest and additional attorney's fees and costs for the further action. 
DATED this ^ 5 ~ day of February, 1999. 
'6/ 
TERRY L. HUTCHINSON, 
SlffiM^OSKI & HUTCHINSON, L.L.C. 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the ^S~day of February, 1999,1 did personally place in the 
U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S 
OPENING BRIEF, to the following: 
Howard F. Gale 
ProSe 
3578 Pomegranate Way 
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Facsimile: (801) 628-1489 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON F. GALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD D. GALE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 966500179 FJ 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court as a result of Plaintiff filing Notice of Entry 
of Foreign Judgment which domesticated a California stipulation and decree dissolving the 
parties' marriage. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 9,1997 to resolve the 
issues of how much credit should be credited to Defendant for paying child support, whether 
or not a $ 10,000.00 judgment in favor of Plaintiff had been paid and other issues. The parties 
submitted briefs and documentary evidence and on October 27, 1997, the Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision. Following an Objection to the Memorandum Decision, the Court 
issued a Ruling dated April 29, 1998. A Hearing on Status was held on August 5, 1998 
A . l 
during which the Court ruled on the issues of attorney's fees and interest rates for pre- and 
post- judgment amounts. An additional hearing on the Defendant's Objection To Judgment 
was held on October 2,1998. Based on the above IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED 
AND ADJUDGED: 
L The Defendant owes Plaintiff the following amounts for unpaid child 
support dating from October, 1986 until August 5, 1998: 1986-$528.00, 1987-52,112.00, 
1988-$2,473.00,1989-$2,250.00, 1990-$2,512.00, 1993-$ 1,944.40, 1994-$177.37. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff overpaid for the years 1991 and 1992 in the amounts of 
$1,335.00 and $1,755.00 respectively. 
2. Interest on the above amounts is 10% per annum from the close of the 
calendar year of each amount until August 5, 1998, after which time the interest shall 
accumulate at the 1998 Utah post-judgment rate of interest of 7.468%. The child support 
overpayments made by Defendant for 1991 and 1992 shall be applied to the earliest child 
support arrearages with payment being made first to interest and then to principal. 
3. Including the Defendant' s credit for child support overpayments in 1991 
and 1992, the principal amount of unpaid child support is $10,206.37. The per diem amount 
of interest which should accrue at the post-judgment rate of interest of 7.468% is $2.09. The 
amount of interest on unpaid child support from the date it was due and owing until August 
5, 1998 is $7,646.98. This amount shall accrue no interest. 
A . 2 
4. The Defendant shall pay Plaintiff an additional $ 10,000.00 as required 
by the original stipulation and Decree of Divorce, which according to the Decree was to be 
paid no later than October 1, 1985. The unpaid interest on the $10,000.00 shall accrue at 
10% from October 1, 1985 until August 5, 1998, for a total of an additional $12,824.66. 
Following August 5, 1998, the post-judgment rate of interest shall result in a per diem 
increase of $2.05. 
5. The Defendant shall pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs as 
described by Plaintiffs Utah counsel. As of April 30, 1998, the fees and costs had totalled 
$6,526.71. Following April 30, additional fees and costs of $1,642.00 were occurred. The 
Plaintiff shall be required to request any additional attorney's fees and costs from the Court 
on an equitable basis. The fees shall accrue interest at the post-judgment rate of interest of 
7.468% . The Court denied the claim of Plaintiff s out-of-state counsel for fees. 
6. In summary, the Plaintiff is awarded from Defendant the following: 
A. Principal on unpaid child support of $10,206.37, which shall accrue 
interest from August 5, 1998 at the post-judgment rate of interest of 7.468% for a per diem 
of $2.09; 
B. Interest at the prejudgment rate of interest of 10% for the unpaid 
child support from the end of the calendar year in which it was incurred until August 5,1998 
for a total amount of $7,646.98, which shall accrue not further interest; 
A -5 
C. Principal amount of $10,000.00 in an unpaid property award from 
the Decree of Divorce which shall accrue interest at the post-judgment rate of interest of 
7.468% per annum, for a per diem amount of $2.05; 
D. Interest on the unpaid $10,000.00 order in the Decree of Divorce 
from October 1, 1985 until August 5, 1998 shall be calculated at the post-judgment rate of 
10% for California judgments and totals $12,824.66. Said amount shall accrue no further 
interest; 
E. Attorney's fees and costs for Utah counsel of $8,168.71, (fees for 
Colorado counsel are hereby denied), said amount shall accrue interest at the post-judgment 
rate of interest of 7.468%. 
DATED this day of &JL _, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
J ^ I E S L. SHUMATE, X 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
A &***"*-
Samuel G. Draper, 
Attorney for Defendant 
A.a 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON F. GALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD D. GALE, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 966500179 
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Objection to Memorandum 
Decision, which Objection was filed on February 3, 1998. Counsel presented their arguments 
in a hearing held April 15, 1998, at which time the Court granted the parties ten days to file 
additional memoranda, and took the matter under advisement. The Court, having reviewed 
the file in this matter, having heard the argument of counsel, and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now issues the following ruling: 
FACTS 
On March 6, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Entry of Foreign Judgment to 
domesticate a California stipulation and decree dissolving the parties1 marriage. In pertinent 
part, this stipulation and decree required the Defendant to pay $440.00 per child per month in 
child support, commencing in October, 1986, and to pay Plaintiff $10,000.00. On January 
9,1997, this Court conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve any remaining issues of the 
case. 
In a Memorandum Decision executed October 27, 1997, this Court addressed the 
issue of child support arrearages owed by Defendant to Plaintiff for the years 1988 through 
1994. At that time, this Court awarded Plaintiff judgment in the amount of $7,571.77 plus 
interest. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed its Objection to Memorandum Decision. In her 
Objection, Plaintiff claims the Memorandum Decision failed to address the following issues: 
A . 5 
child support arrearages for the years 1986 through 1987; a $10,000.00 money judgment 
awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to the divorce; and attorney fees. 
It is Plaintiffs position Defendant did not pay child support in 1986 or 1987, 
Defendant has not yet paid her the $10,000.00 awarded to her by the divorce, and claims she 
is entitled to attorney fees. 
However, Defendant claims to have paid his child support obligations for 1986 
through 1987 in full, but that records of this fact no longer exist. Defendant also argues that, 
regardless of whether he paid that support, Plaintiffs claims for such relief are time-barred 
by the Utah statute of limitations. In addition, while Defendant does not deny Plaintiff was 
awarded $10,000.00 by the divorce, he argues that this obligation has already been satisfied. 
Defendant contends the parties agreed Defendant would pay the balance owing on her 
automobile in lieu of paying her $10,000.00 in cash. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
is not justified in seeking an award of attorney fees because the amount of fees she has 
incurred exceed the judgment amount awarded Plaintiff in the Memorandum Decision. 
This Court is in agreement that these are the issues remaining for its determination. 
ANALYSIS 
Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code Annotated (U.C. A.) provides an eight-year 
statute of limitations for actions to be commenced "upon a judgment or decree of any court of 
the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States . . ." In terms of 
foreign judgments, if a foreign judgment is properly authenticated, it "may be filed with the 
clerk of any district court in Utah . . . [and shall thereafter be treated] in all respects as a 
judgment of a district court of Utah." U.C.A. § 78-22a-12(2) (1997). 
Therefore, once filed in Utah, foreign judgments are essentially transformed into 
Utah judgments, and are subject to the Utah statute of limitations period. See Pan Energy v. 
Martin. 813 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 1991). Specifically, 
-2-
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[F]or purposes of enforcement, the filing of a foreign 
judgment under § 78-22a-2(2) creates a new Utah judgment 
which is governed by the Utah statute of limitations. 
Because [the Foreign Judgment Act] establishes an eight-year 
statute of limitations for the enforcement of judgments, 
foreign judgments filed in Utah must also be governed by the 
eight-year statute of limitations, which runs from the date of 
filing. 
Pan Energy v. Martin. 813 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
At issue here is what precisely is intended by the terms "from the date of filing.w 
The ambiguity rests in whether the date of filing refers to the filing of the original judgment 
in the rendering state, or the foreign judgment in Utah. 
The Defendant's interpretation would commence the eight-year statute of limitations 
period at the time the original judgment was filed in California. However, this Court finds 
that interpretation to be erroneous. 
In footnote 1 to the Pan Energy decision, the Utah Supreme Court states that "the 
life of the judgment also extends eight years from the date of filing." The Court then cites 
several cases from other jurisdictions which hold that it is the foreign judgment filing which 
extends the statute of limitations. For example, in Wellington v. Wellington. 575 P.2d 1088, 
1090 (Wash. App. 1978), the court held: 
The rule in this state is that if a judgment creditor, in good 
faith, timely commences an action upon a judgment of a 
sister state, he can, in effect, extend the duration of that 
judgment beyond the period of 6 years following its 
rendition. The Washington judgment is a new judgment, 
standing on its own, and the time period for executing upon 
it commenced to run from the date of its entry. 
Similarly, in Warner v. Warner. 668 P.2d 193, 195 (Kan. App. 1983), the court held: 
[Registration of a foreign judgment which is enforceable 
when registered gives the judgment creditor a new and 
-3-
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additional five years to execute, regardless of when the 
judgment was rendered in the foreign state. 
Based on its reference to these and other cases with similar findings, the Utah Supreme Court 
intended its statutes of limitations to run as of the date the foreign judgment was entered in 
Utah. 
Therefore, upon filing the foreign judgment in Utah, which in this case was filed on 
March 6, 1996, the Plaintiff was given an additional eight years to pursue her claims for 
relief. Accordingly, this Court finds that, as the California statute of limitations period had 
not expired at the time Plaintiff filed her Notice of Foreign Judgment, Plaintiffs child support 
reimbursement claim and $10,000.00 money judgment claim are not time-barred in Utah. 
In terms of child support arrearages, when claiming retroactive payment for child 
support, the payments due should be characterized as "reimbursement" rather than "child 
support." See State of Utah v. Irizarry. 945 P.2d 676, 680, 326 Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1997).l 
As such, any claim for reimbursement is subject to the same legal and equitable defenses that 
are available to other debt cases. See id.2 
With respect to what individuals may seek reimbursement, an "obligee" is defined 
as "a person to whom a duty of support is owed, or who is entitled to reimbursement of 
support or public assistance." U.C.A. § 62A-11-303(12) (1997). An "obligor" is defined as 
the individual who owes a duty of support. U.C.A.§ 62A-11-303(11) (1997). 
The defense of equitable estoppel may be used to defeat a party's claim for 
reimbursement if the obligor can satisfy the following elements: (1) the obligee made 
1
 "[W]e decline to employ the euphemism 'back child support1 for payments that were 
not available to meet past needs and are not even legally required to be used for the 
children's present and future needs." Id, 
2
 "This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support; and it is 
subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same manner as any other 
debt." Baggs v. Anderson. 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974). 
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representations, or acted in a manner which led the obligor to believe support payments were 
not required; (2) the obligor relied on the obligee's representations or actions and did not 
make payments; (3) as a result of the obligee's representations or actions, the obligor changed 
his position, which he or she would not have done but for the obligee's representations or 
actions; and (4) enforcing payment of past due installments would create great hardship and 
injustice. See Larson v. Larson. 300 P.2d 596, 598 (Utah 1956). 
In terms of the present case, it is this Court's opinion that no evidence was 
introduced to establish Defendant relied upon a representation made by Plaintiff that he was 
not obligated to support his children, and thereafter changed his circumstances in light of that 
representation. 
To establish the defense of laches, which may also be used to defeat a party's claim 
for reimbursement, an obligor must demonstrate the obligee unreasonably delayed in bringing 
an action, and that the obligor was prejudiced by that delay. See Borland v. Chandler. 733 
P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987). 
At the time Plaintiff domesticated the California judgment, approximately eleven 
years had elapsed since the divorce stipulation and decree were filed in California. During 
that time, it is acknowledged by both parties that Defendant made some efforts towards 
satisfying his child support obligation. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff may have 
entertained a reasonable belief, up until the time she domesticated the California judgment, 
that Defendant would satisfy his child support obligations. In addition, no evidence was 
introduced to establish Defendant was prejudiced by Plaintiffs delay in bringing her action. 
That Defendant was aware of his legal duty to support his children is obvious by his 
continued efforts to satisfy that obligation. In this Court's opinion, that Defendant may not 
have paid those amounts in full, and may subsequently be ordered to, does not rise to the 
level of prejudice required for a laches defense. 
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However, in determining the amount of reimbursement owed by Defendant to 
Plaintiff, this Court is granted discretion in arriving at that sum.3 In its review of the record, 
and its Memorandum Decision, this Court finds that for those periods in which documentation 
was available, the Defendant consistently fell short on his child support obligation by 
approximately twenty to twenty-five percent. In addition, for the years 1986 and 1987, 
Defendant had a total support obligation of $2,640.00 for October through December, 1986, 
and $10,560.00 for the year 1987, for a total of $13,200.00 for that time period. Based on 
the amounts paid by Defendant in the years subsequent to 1986-87, this Court finds that 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $2,640.00, or twenty percent of the total 
amount owed during those years, plus interest, to satisfy Defendant's child support obligation 
for the years 1986 and 1987. 
With respect to the $10,000.00 awarded Plaintiff by the divorce, the Defendant 
stated he and Plaintiff had an agreement whereby he would pay the balance due on an 
automobile in lieu of paying Plaintiff the $10,000.00 directly. However, the Plaintiff did not 
testify to the existence of such an agreement. The Defendant did not produce any evidence 
establishing the existence of this agreement. Without some indication, other than Defendant's 
testimony that there was an agreement, this Court cannot agree that an accord and satisfaction 
of that $10,000.00 occurred. Therefore, this Court finds that Defendant remains obligated to 
Plaintiff for that amount. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff should be barred from pursuing the $10,000.00 on 
grounds of equitable estoppel or laches. The elements for these defenses were outlined 
3
 See Ciraulo v. Ciraulo. 576 P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1978), in which the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed a trial court's finding that a father did not satisfy his support obligation when 
there was a lack of documentary evidence: "[W]e see nothing to persuade us that the findings 
and judgment of the trial court . . . was [sic] anything other than fair, reasonable and 
equitable, and well within the comparatively wide latitude of discretion we have always 
recognized the trial court should have in such matters.'' 
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previously in this Ruling in relation to child support reimbursement. In the context of the 
money judgment, Defendant offered no evidence which would support an equitable estoppel 
defense. This Court did not receive any evidence or testimony from either party which would 
establish Plaintiff either said or did something which would lead Defendant to believe that 
obligation was satisfied. While Defendant contends he paid for an automobile, and believed 
that doing so extinguished his obligation, no evidence was offered establishing he in fact paid 
for the car. This analysis would also apply to the laches defense, and this Court would add 
that Plaintiff was still within her rights to pursue the claim for statute of limitations purposes. 
Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for 
$10,000.00. 
With respect to attorney fees, generally these fees may be recovered if permitted by 
statute or contract. See Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In 
terms of actions for child support reimbursement, U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2) (1997) provides: 
In any action to enforce an order of . . . child support . . ., 
the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the 
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
In addition, an award of attorney fees in a case such as this requires evidence to 
support that the fee is reasonable in amount and commensurate with those commonly charged 
in the community, the hours expended on the case were necessary, and the party requesting 
the fees has demonstrated a need. 
While this Court finds that Plaintiff has substantially prevailed upon her claims, 
counsel for Plaintiff has not yet submitted an affidavit of attorney fees. Therefore, this Court 
is unable to ascertain the reasonableness of the rates charged, or of the amount sought. 
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Accordingly, this Court reserves the issue of attorney fees until it is receives and reviews an 
affidavit of attorney fees. 
Therefore, the Memorandum Decision should be amended to include an award of 
$2,640.00 in child support reimbursement for the period of October, 1986 through December, 
1987, and an award of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff as provided for in the divorce stipulation and 
decree. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to incorporate the findings and 
conclusions contained in this Ruling into its proposed order, and to submit the proposed order 
to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at St. George, Utah this 2/ day of April, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUB6E JAMES L. SHUMATC 
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